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The Policy Views of Partisan
Election Officials*
David C. Kimball,** Martha Kropf,*** Donald Moynihan,****
Carol L. Silva,***** and Brady Baybeck******
In the debate about partisan election administration, little attention
has been focused on the views of local election officials. Election officials
can be purveyors of partisanship as well as observers of the election
administration environment. We use a series of national surveys of local
election officials to examine the degree to which local officials of opposing
parties have different policy preferences about election administration. We
find that partisan differences are largely confined to officials serving heavily
populated local jurisdictions. We also examine whether partisanship is
related to the views of local officials toward state election administration.
We find evaluations of state administrators have less to do with party
affiliation and more to do with outside forces largely beyond their control.
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Three presidential election cycles beyond the fateful 2000 elections, and a
decade beyond the passage of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA),1
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scholars, journalists, and advocates still debate election procedures.2 One major
reform that has not received serious attention from policymakers is to change the
way in which most local election officials are chosen.3 Some advocate switching to
more independent and nonpartisan election officials at the state and local level.4 In
part, this is a reaction to instances of partisan election officials behaving
incompetently or in ways that seem designed to further the interests of their
political party rather than those of the broader voting public.5
Furthermore, many observers lament the decentralized nature of election
administration in the United States.6 In this country, there are thousands of local
officials managing elections in counties or towns, and local officials vary in terms
of their party affiliation and the manner in which they are chosen. Almost twothirds of local election officials (LEOs) are elected to their positions (the
remainder are appointed).7 For approximately half of local election officials, their
affiliation with one of the two major political parties is a critical feature of the
selection process.8 This local variation provides scholars with some leverage to
examine the impact of different methods for selecting LEOs. For example, some
evidence indicates that election officials who are elected behave differently than
appointed officials.9 In some instances, it appears that Democratic election
officials behave differently than Republican officials.10 Interestingly, the attitudes
2. See, e.g., Nonpartisan Election Officials, FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=70 (last
visited Aug. 29, 2012).
3. MARTHA KROPF & DAVID C. KIMBALL, HELPING AMERICA VOTE: THE LIMITS OF
ELECTION REFORM 96–100 (2012); see also RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM
FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 105–10 (2012) (describing an Ohio secretary
of state’s controversial election decisions in 2008 involving instructions given to local election
officials).
4. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 125, 131–37 (2009); Nonpartisan Election Officials, supra note 2; Robert A. Pastor,
Nonpartisan Election Administration: Model Legislation for the States, AM. UNIV. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY &
ELECTION MGMT. (July 15, 2009), http://www.american.edu/spa/cdem/upload/nonpartisanmodel
legislation08-2009.pdf.
5. HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM
IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 16–23 (2009); Daniel P. Tokaji, Lowenstein Contra Lowenstein: Conflicts
of Interest in Election Administration, 9 ELECTION L.J. 421, 422 (2010); see also HASEN, supra note 3,
at 21–23.
6. GERKEN, supra note 5, at 20–23; HASEN, supra note 3, at 2–5; Tokaji, supra note 4, at 141
(“[Decentralization] does not eliminate the problems that exist when a state chief election official
employs considerable discretion to administer state election law in a manner that benefits his or her
party.”).
7. David C. Kimball & Martha Kropf, The Street-Level Bureaucrats of Elections: Selection Methods for
Local Election Officials, 23 REV. POL’ Y RES. 1257, 1261 (2006).
8. See id. at 1259–61.
9. See Barry C. Burden et al., The Effect of Administrative Burden on Bureaucratic Perception of Policies:
Evidence from Election Administration, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 741, 748 (2012). But see Martha Kropf et al.,
Representative Bureaucracy and Partisanship: The Implementation of Election Law, 73 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 242,
248 (2013) (finding no difference between elected and appointed officials in terms of attitudes toward
provisional voting).
10. See, e.g., David C. Kimball et al., Helping America Vote? Election Administration, Partisanship,
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expressed by local election officials have received relatively little study, in spite of a
rather longstanding assumption by many scholars that the attitudes of government
officials influence their behavior.11 Given the decentralized nature of election
administration, local election officials may be less vigorous in enforcing election
laws that they do not support.12 In addition, the relationship between a local
official and the state officer running elections has received even less attention—
how does partisanship affect the perceptions of local officials toward the state
officials?
The purpose of this Article is to examine the attitudes of local election
officials toward election policies and about the perceived level of contentiousness
in their local jurisdiction and in their state. Election officials can be both
purveyors and observers of partisan conflict in election administration. Do
Democratic and Republican officials have different election policy preferences?
Do local officials perceive that partisan conflict permeates election administration
in their state or locality? How does the partisanship of the top state election
official affect that perception? In the last few years, a series of national surveys of
local election officials have been conducted. We merged data from three such
surveys with data on the selection method and partisanship of local election
officials.13 Two of the surveys were conducted under the auspices of the
Congressional Research Service (2005 and 2007)14 and the other under the Pew
Center on the States.15 These data allowed us to examine the degree to which
partisanship correlates with the observations and policy preferences of local
election officials.
These surveys also allowed us to examine whether partisanship affects what
is a key relationship in most, if not all, states: the relationship between state and
local election officials. In particular, we could examine whether having a partisan
state official affects the perception of conflict in local jurisdictions and satisfaction
with the state election office. If the party affiliations of state and local officials
have little bearing on these perceptions, then one may wonder whether a move to
nonpartisan administrators would substantially change the relationship between
state and local election officials.
and Provisional Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election, 5 ELECTION L.J. 447, 448–50 (2006); Kropf et al.,
supra note 9, at 247–50; Guy Stuart, Databases, Felons, and Voting: Bias and Partisanship of the Florida Felons
List in the 2000 Elections, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 453, 461–63 (2004).
11. Kenneth J. Meier, Representative Bureaucracy: A Theoretical and Empirical Exposition, 2 RES.
PUB. ADMIN. 1, 4–5 (1993); Sally Coleman Selden et al., Bureaucracy as a Representative Institution: Toward
a Reconciliation of Bureaucratic Government and Democratic Theory, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 717, 718–19 (1998).
12. E.g., Kropf et al., supra note 9, at 247–48.
13. Kimball & Kropf, supra note 7, at 1261–62.
14. Donald P. Moynihan & Carol L. Silva, The Administrators of Democracy: A Research Note
on Local Election Officials, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 816, 816 (2008).
15. David C. Kimball & Brady Baybeck, Are all Jurisdictions Equal? Size Disparity in Election
Administration, 12 ELECTION L.J. 130, 131–32 (2013); Back to Paper, ELECTIONONLINE.ORG (Feb. 17,
2008), http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2008/eb21brief.pdf.
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In general, we found considerable variation in the policy preferences of local
election officials. However, in these different surveys of local election officials, we
observed partisan differences in their policy views only in those jurisdictions that
are heavily populated. In addition, LEO evaluations of the environment in which
they work were more strongly influenced by outside forces, such as the
presidential campaign and difficulties implementing HAVA, than by their own
party affiliation.
I. PARTISANSHIP IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
A political environment characterized by increasing partisan polarization16
and a series of competitive national elections, particularly the presidential election
of 2000, have fueled a growing number of clashes over election procedures in the
United States.17 In this climate, there is an increased perception that candidates
and political parties may try to manipulate election laws and procedures for
political gain.18
In recent years, partisan conflicts are evident in legislative debates in
Congress and in many state legislatures about photo ID requirements for voters,
restoring voting rights for felons, purging inactive and ineligible voters from
registration lists, Election Day (and Same Day) registration, curbs on registration
efforts by outside groups, limits on early voting, and other election laws.19 In
general, Democratic policy makers tend to prefer policies that reduce barriers to
voting, while Republican lawmakers tend to prefer policies that reduce election
fraud.20 In legislative debates, the two policy goals are often set in opposition and
against one another in a zero-sum framework. For example, policies to combat
fraud are often described by opponents as increasing barriers to voting.21 Similarly,
policies to reduce voting barriers are often perceived by opponents as increasing
opportunities for fraud.22 In addition, there is some evidence of partisan divisions
in public opinion on election administration issues. For example, Republicans tend

16. NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND
UNEQUAL RICHES 1–3 (2006); RICHARD G. NIEMI ET AL., Is the American Electorate Polarized?,
in CONTROVERSIES IN VOTING BEHAVIOR 221, 223–27 (Richard G. Niemi et al. eds., 5th ed. 2011).
17. HASEN, supra note 3, at 5; Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S.
Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 946–59 (2005).
18. Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement, and the Help
America Vote Act, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1248 (2005).
19. ROBERT PASTOR, AM. UNIV. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTION MGMT., VOTER IDS
ARE NOT THE PROBLEM: A SURVEY OF THREE STATES 3–4 (2008); Stuart, supra note 10, at 454–56,
458–61.
20. HASEN, supra note 3, at 6–8; KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 3, at 100–01.
21. See PASTOR, supra note 19, at 3.
22. See HASEN, supra note 3, at 109–10 (discussing a dispute in Ohio over a five-day period
during the 2008 election during which a person could simultaneously register to vote and cast an early
ballot).

2013]

THE POLICY VIEWS OF ELECTION OFFICIALS

555

to believe that voter fraud and impersonation occur more frequently than
Democrats do.23
In terms of the administration of elections, there is some evidence of
partisan differences in the implementation of election law across local
jurisdictions. For example, Stuart found differences between Democratic and
Republican local officials in Florida in their enthusiasm for purging voter
registration lists.24 Other studies have found partisan differences in the
administration and implementation of provisional voting.25 Recent research
further indicates that partisan attitudes have a direct impact on program
administration—at least in the administration of provisional voting.26 However,
we do not yet know much about partisan differences in policy attitudes among
local election officials.27
This is not to say that we do not have some excellent information about
LEO attitudes. In fact, Moynihan and Silva found a variety of attitudes toward
recent federal election law changes due to local resource constraints, goal
congruence, and willingness to accept federal involvement in elections.28
However, we do not know whether such attitudes are rooted in partisanship.
It would not be surprising to find partisan differences among LEOs. Political
scientists argue that an individual’s attachment to a political party develops early in
life and may even grow stronger with time.29 Officials may try to leave these
attitudes at the courthouse steps, given the job, but there appears to be a conflict
of interest between serving one’s political party and serving the public interest.30
For example, in the case of provisional voting, there is some evidence that
partisanship does affect LEO attitudes and program administration.31
Furthermore, LEOs operate in a partisan context where external forces are
likely to affect the attitudes of officials and the implementation of election
programs. State legislatures sometimes pass partisan legislation designed to tilt the
electoral playing field in favor of the majority party.32 Partisan governors
occasionally make demands on the way election officials do their jobs.33 Political
parties and interest groups file lawsuits challenging election laws and

23. Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of
Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1761 (2008).
24. Stuart, supra note 10, at 461–62.
25. HASEN, supra note 3, at 112, 148–49; KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 3, at 103–06; Kimball
& Kropf, supra note 7, at 1258–59.
26. Kropf et al., supra note 9, at 247–48.
27. See Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 15, at 135–36.
28. Moynihan & Silva, supra note 14, at 821–22.
29. E.g., DONALD GREEN ET AL., PARTISAN HEARTS & MINDS: POLITICAL PARTIES AND
THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF VOTERS 2–5 (2002).
30. Tokaji, supra note 5, at 422, 431–35.
31. Kropf et al., supra note 9, at 247.
32. See, e.g., Tokaji, supra note 18, at 1207, 1220–24, 1228–29, 1242–43.
33. See, e.g., Tokaji, supra note 4, at 134.
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administrative practices.34 As Hasen notes, the annual number of election lawsuits
in the United States has doubled since 2000.35 Activists and opinion leaders make
provocative, and often unsubstantiated, claims about voter fraud or voter
suppression.36 In an increasingly polarized body politic, all of these activities bring
partisan conflict to state and local election officials whether they want it or not.
And we cannot discount the idea that these external forces may also affect who is
selected to be the person administrating elections in a particular jurisdiction—a
person who may or may not share attitudes with the “powers that be” or the
majority of the electorate.
We also expect that the effects of partisanship on LEO policy preferences
and attitudes regarding the contentiousness of the election environment will be
conditioned by the size of the jurisdiction. Research indicates that partisan
political activity is more prevalent in heavily populated local jurisdictions.37 This
factor may have a direct effect on behavior—and the reported attitudes and
perceptions of LEOs. Another reason to expect that partisan LEOs in larger
jurisdictions think differently than those in smaller jurisdictions rests on the
assumptions one makes about the nature of politics in a large jurisdiction. If one
thinks that there is partisan manipulation on the part of “external forces” such as
political parties, one can assume that manipulation is strategic; the parties will
focus their efforts where they can influence the most voters in the most
“important” elections and using the fewest resources. Therefore, since
manipulating elections in heavily populated local jurisdictions could affect the
outcome of relatively close statewide elections, then affecting the decisions of
LEOs in large jurisdictions may be seen as more efficient. We expect that the
same will hold for lawsuits and potential rule changes. In contrast, officials in
smaller jurisdictions, because they serve so few voters, would have much less of an
impact on the outcome of state elections. As a result, we expect that partisan
disputes over election administration are most likely to be fought either at the
state level or in large local jurisdictions.
To summarize, we expect that jurisdiction size strengthens the impact of
partisanship on the policy attitudes and perceptions of local election officials. If
partisan disputes over election administration are more likely to occur in large
jurisdictions, then it also seems logical to hypothesize that local officials in large
jurisdictions are more likely to take a position in those disputes. As a result, party
positions on election policies are more likely to be internalized by local officials in
large jurisdictions. And, ultimately, political parties likely make more of an effort

34. HASEN, supra note 3, at 134.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Ryan Joyce, Note, ACORN and the 2008 Presidential Election Campaign: Perspectives
on Alleged Third-Party Voter-Registration Fraud, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 313, 318–19 (2009).
37. Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 15, at 132–33, 135.
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to influence the selection of election officials in large jurisdictions than in small
ones.
However, it is not just jurisdiction size that affects perceptions of
contentiousness and policy attitudes. We also expect that parties and their allies
will make an extra effort to influence election administration in battleground
states, the most competitive states in a presidential campaign. The presidency is by
far the most influential elected position in American politics, and the presidential
campaign dominates other contests in terms of the resources and personnel
deployed. As a result, political parties pay special attention to manipulating
election laws in states most likely to swing the outcome of a presidential election.
It is no coincidence that Ohio and Florida, two perennial battleground states, are
frequent targets of election legislation and litigation where the two major parties
are on opposing sides.38 Thus, we expect that local officials working in
battleground states will report more political conflict in election administration. In
the rest of the Article, we examine data from surveys of local election officials to
analyze the role of partisanship in their attitudes toward election administration.
II. DATA
We examined data from three national surveys of local election officials,
conducted in 2005, 2007, and 2009. The 2005 and 2007 surveys were conducted in
a similar fashion, shortly after the fall national elections and continuing into the
spring of the following year. The sampling frame for these two surveys was based
on a national database of local election officials created by the Election Reform
Information Project, and samples were drawn using a stratified method based on
the number of local jurisdictions in a state. The data were collected primarily by an
electronic survey, with paper surveys mailed to nonrespondents. Each of the two
surveys produced over 1500 respondents, a roughly forty percent response rate in
each case. For more details on the 2005 and 2007 surveys of local election
officials, see Moynihan and Silva (2008).39
The 2009 survey of local election officials was conducted from December of
2008 to March of 2009 based on a sampling frame of 10,370 local jurisdictions in
the United States with responsibility for hiring and training poll workers. A
stratified sample was drawn from that list based on the number of voters in each
local jurisdiction. An electronic survey was sent to local officials with an e-mail
address and a paper survey was mailed to the other local officials. The data
collection produced 900 respondents, a response rate of thirty-one percent. The
2009 survey is described in more detail by Kimball and Baybeck.40 For all three
surveys, we matched the survey responses to data on the party affiliation and

38.
39.
40.

See Tokaji, supra note 18, at 1209–10, 1220–39.
Moynihan & Silva, supra note 14, at 817–24.
Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 15, at 131–32.
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method of selection of the local election official. For the 2005 and 2007 surveys,
the matched data on the partisanship and method of selection of local officials
come from Kimball and Kropf.41 For the 2009 survey, the matched data were
compiled separately for the jurisdictions in the survey sample.42 The appendix
provides some evidence that each of the surveys provided a representative sample
of local election officials in the United States.
III. ELECTION POLICY PREFERENCES OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
We first attempt to answer a fundamental question about election
administrators. That is, do Democratic and Republican local election officials have
different views about election law? We start by examining the ideological positions
of local election officials. The 2007 national survey asked local officials to place
themselves on an ideological scale from one (“strongly liberal”) to seven
(“strongly conservative”). Figure 1 indicates that the ideological gulf between
Democratic and Republican local officials is much more pronounced in large
jurisdictions than in small jurisdictions. We defined a large local jurisdiction as one
that serves more than 40,000 voters in a presidential election. Like the American
public,43 local election officials, on average, identify somewhat more toward the
conservative side of the ideological spectrum. In the more numerous small local
jurisdictions, Republican officials are slightly more conservative than Democratic
and nonpartisan local officials (a difference of just less than half a point on the
seven-point ideology scale). However, in large jurisdictions the difference between
the average Republican and average Democratic local official is more than one and
a half points. As the figure shows, the partisan divide in ideology among local
election officials is much more evident in large jurisdictions.
The more important question is whether Republican and Democratic
election officials have different preferences when it comes to particular election
laws. One election policy that has been the subject of growing partisan
disagreement is whether to require voters to show photo ID when they vote.44 In
state legislative debates, photo ID laws have been strongly supported by
Republicans and usually opposed by Democrats.45 Thus, one might expect
Republican local election officials to be the strongest supporters of a photo ID
requirement. The 2007 national survey included three questions about a photo ID
requirement and its likely impact on elections. Support for a photo ID
requirement was measured on a scale from zero to ten, with higher numbers

41.
42.
43.

Kimball & Kropf, supra note 7, at 1260–62.
Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 15, at 135.
ROSALEE A. CLAWSON & ZOE M. OXLEY, PUBLIC OPINION: DEMOCRATIC IDEALS,
DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE (2d ed., 2013).
44. PASTOR, supra note 19, at 3–8.
45. Id. at 4.
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indicating stronger support.46 We found considerable variation among the local
election officials, although, on average, they leaned toward supporting a photo ID
requirement. Approximately twenty-five percent of local officials gave a response
less than four, and more than forty-five percent gave a response higher than seven.
Figure 1: Mean LEO Political Ideology by Party Affiliation
and Size of Jurisdiction47

Mean Ideology

7

5

4.9

5
4.5

4.4

4
3.4

3

1
Small

Large

Jurisdiction Size
LEO Party
Republican
Other

Democrat

The results in Table 1 show that partisan differences in LEO attitudes
toward photo ID requirements exist only in large jurisdictions. On average,
Republican, Democratic, and nonpartisan local officials in small jurisdictions
(those serving less than 40,000 voters) share the same views about photo ID: mild
support for the requirement, a belief that it will modestly improve election
security, and a belief that it will slightly reduce voter turnout. In contrast, we
observed more polarized opinions among officials serving large jurisdictions. In
large jurisdictions, Republican officials are substantially more supportive of the

46. We do find stronger support for a photo ID requirement among officials from states that
have already imposed that requirement. Support for a photo ID requirement is only weakly associated
with perceptions of voter fraud. When asked to respond to a statement that deliberate voter fraud is a
serious problem in their jurisdiction, over ninety percent of local officials strongly disagreed.
47. Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials.
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photo ID requirement and more optimistic about its impact on election security
and turnout than Democratic and nonpartisan local officials.
Table 1: Mean Photo ID Attitudes by LEO Partisanship
and Size of Jurisdiction48
Support Photo
ID
Requirement
Jurisdiction Size

Small

Large

LEO Party
Republican

6.3

Democrat
Other/Nonpartisan

N

Photo ID
Impact on
Security

Photo ID
Impact on
Voter Turnout

Small

Large

Small

7.9*

2.4

3.4*

-1.1

0.2*

6.3

4.9

2.4

1.5

-1.1

-1.4

6.2

4.5

2.5

1.6

-1.1

-1.8

1025

199

1030

199

1028

199

Large

Note: Cell entries are group means for responses to each question. Large jurisdictions
served at least 40,000 voters in the 2004 presidential election. Small jurisdictions served
fewer than 40,000 voters. The support for photo ID scale ranges from zero (“[n]ot support
at all”) to ten (“[e]xtremely supportive”). The impact on security scale ranges from negative
five (“[l]ess secure”) to positive five (“[m]ore secure”). The impact on turnout scale ranges
from negative five (“[d]ecreased turnout”) to positive five (“[i]ncreased turnout”).
* Differences between Republican and other local election officials are statistically
significant at p < 0.01.

We found a very similar pattern in the 2009 national survey of local election
officials. The survey included two questions about antifraud policies: (1) a photo
ID requirement for all voters and (2) deleting names from registration lists if they
do not match other state records.49 The survey also included two questions about
proposals to make voter registration easier: (1) Election Day registration and (2)
automatically registering all citizens over eighteen years of age.50 Officials rated
their preference for each policy on a scale from one (“[s]trongly oppose”) to five
(“[s]trongly favor”).51 We expected to find that Republican local officials are more
supportive of the antifraud policies while Democratic officials offer more support
for the policies to ease voter registration. Among these four items, the antifraud
measures are more popular among local officials than policies to ease voter
registration. We again found substantial variation in support for these election

48.
49.
50.
51.

Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials.
Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 15, at 135.
Id.
Id.
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policies. Each item has a standard deviation greater than 1.2. Given that each item
has a range of four, the standard deviation figures indicate considerable variation
in the election reform policy attitudes of local election officials.
Table 2: Mean Support for Election Policies by LEO Partisanship
and Size of Jurisdiction52
Require
Photo ID to
Vote

Delete Names Election Day
if No Match to Registration
Other Lists

Automatic
Registration

Jurisdiction Size

Small

LEO Party
Republican

3.9

4.1*

3.0

3.0*

1.5

1.4*

2.2

Democrat

3.9

3.2

2.9

2.4

1.6

1.9

2.3

2.5

Other/Nonpartisan

3.7

3.6

3.1

2.8

3.2

2.3

2.6

2.6

N

486

Large

237

Small

486

Large

232

Small

486

Large

237

Small

486

Large

2.0*

232

Note: Cell entries are group means for responses to each question. The policy scales range
from one (“[s]trongly oppose”) to five (“[s]trongly favor”). * Differences between Republican
and Democratic local election officials are statistically significant at p < 0.01.

We compared mean support for each of the four policies by partisanship and
jurisdiction size in Table 2. Once again, we only observed significant differences
between Democratic and Republican local officials in large jurisdictions. On the
antifraud measures, local officials of each party in small jurisdictions tend to offer
moderate support for a photo ID requirement and take a neutral position on “no
match, no vote” policies. In large jurisdictions, Republican officials indicated
stronger support for both antifraud policies than Democratic or nonpartisan
officials. We tended to observe opposition among local officials, on average, to
the two policies to make voter registration easier. In addition, the positions of
Democrats and Republicans in small jurisdictions are very similar. In large
jurisdictions, however, Republican officials are more opposed to Election Day
registration and automatic registration than Democrats. We also observed stronger
support for Election Day registration among nonpartisan officials than among
either major party. This is likely due to the fact that nonpartisan local election
officials are heavily concentrated in states that already allow Election Day
registration, where the policy is more popular than in the rest of the nation.
Overall, the survey data support a consistent conclusion. There are
significant differences between the policy preferences of Democratic and
Republican local officials serving heavily populated local jurisdictions but little to
52.

Source: 2009 Survey of Local Election Officials.
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no partisan differences among election officials in small jurisdictions.53 On the one
hand, local election officials serving in large jurisdictions are a relatively small
fraction of the universe of local officials. That is, they comprise less than ten
percent of local administrators in the United States. On the other hand, local
administrators in large jurisdictions serve roughly seventy percent of the voters in
national elections.54 Thus, a large number of voters may be affected if partisanship
influences the way those officials administer elections.
IV. EVALUATIONS OF STATE AND LOCAL CONDITIONS
We also examined the attitudes of local election officials about the
environment in which they work. We have some data to test whether local
officials report partisan conflict as a problem in their work. The 2007 national
survey asked local election officials to indicate the level of political conflict in the
environment in which they operate. Local officials answered on a scale from zero
(“not contentious at all”) to ten (“extremely contentious”). Figure 2 provides the
distribution of responses to this question and it shows substantial variation. While
the average official tended toward the perception of “less contentious,” thirty-five
percent of officials reported more than a moderately contentious election
environment.
Two additional questions on the 2007 survey asked about state election
administrators. One question asked local officials whether state election
administration is independent of partisan politics. Respondents rated state
administrators on a scale from zero (“not independent at all”) to ten (“very
independent”). Figure 3 provides the distribution of responses. While local
officials tended to report that state administration is independent of partisan
politics, more than twenty-five percent of local officials placed their state
administrators on the lower half of the scale. When we take the first two questions
together, a significant minority of local officials reported a fair amount of political
and partisan conflict in election administration.

53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 13.
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Figure 2: How Politically Contentious Is Election Administration?55
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Figure 3: Is State Election Administration Independent of Partisan Politics?56
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55. Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials. Note: The scale ranges from zero (“not
contentious at all”) to ten (“extremely contentious”).
56. Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials. Note: The scale ranges from zero (“not
independent at all”) to ten (“very independent”).
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A final question asked local officials how satisfied they are with election
administration in their state. Local officials responded on a scale from zero (“not
satisfied at all”) to ten (“extremely satisfied”). The distribution of responses is
pictured in Figure 4. The graph shows generally positive evaluations of state
election administration—only fifteen percent of local officials chose responses in
the bottom half of the scale.
Figure 4: Satisfaction with State Election Administration57
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We conducted further analyses of responses to these three questions to
assess whether evaluations of the state and local environment are shaped more by
LEO party affiliation or by outside forces. One of the most important outside
forces may be the party affiliation of the state official. But other forces may also
influence how the official evaluates the election administration environment. Each
of the items evaluating the election administration environment pictured above
serves as a dependent variable in a regression function. We included several
independent variables, described below, as predictors of the perceptions of local
election officials. We did not find significant differences between Democratic,
Republican, and nonpartisan local officials in their evaluations of state
administrators and the local environment. Instead, the party affiliation of the top
state election official may be more important for these evaluations.

57. Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials. Note: The scale ranges from zero (“not
satisfied at all”) to ten (“extremely satisfied”).
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We hypothesize that partisan conflict between the local official and the state
administrator may influence assessments of state election administration.
Specifically, evaluations of state administrators may be more favorable when both
officials share the same party affiliation and more unfavorable when state and
local officials come from opposing parties. Agency theory generally holds that
conflict is likely to occur in governance when principals and agents hold different
preferences.58 To test these hypotheses, we coded the party affiliation and method
of selection for the top election official in each state. In most states, the top
official is an elected and partisan secretary of state.59 For the time period covered
by this study, fifteen states have an appointed state election official or board,
although in most of those cases the appointment comes from the governor’s
political party.60 In all but five states the top election office is affiliated with a
major political party. Adding these variables to our data revealed that one-third of
the local election officials shared the same party affiliation as the top state official,
while roughly seventeen percent of local officials came from the opposite party as
the state official. The remaining fifty percent were local officials who served in a
nonpartisan or bipartisan capacity,61 and they serve as the baseline for comparison
in our model. Our equation also includes independent variables indicating whether
the top state official was elected (or not) and whether the top state election office
was partisan. This allowed us to test whether local officials perceive more partisan
politics when the state official is elected or partisan.
We examined three variables that captured the influence of outside forces on
evaluations of the election administration environment. One was a measure of the
size of the local jurisdiction, calculated as the natural log of the number of voters
in the 2004 presidential election. Because of the heightened level of partisan
activity occurring in large jurisdictions, as discussed above, we expect local
officials in larger jurisdictions to report higher levels of political conflict. In
addition, large jurisdictions tend to present more challenges for election officials,62
another reason to expect officials in large jurisdictions to offer a dimmer
assessment of election administration. A second measure of outside forces is a
dummy variable denoting the battleground states in the 2004 presidential election,
as reported by Shaw.63 Because of the extra efforts of political parties in
presidential campaigns, we expect local officials in battleground states to express
more partisan conflict and less satisfaction with state election administration.
The final outside force reflects the administrative burden imposed by
58. R. Michael Alvarez & Thad E. Hall, Controlling Democracy: The Principal-Agent Problems
in Election Administration, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 491, 492 (2006).
59. Kimball et al., supra note 10, at 452.
60. Id.; Hasen, supra note 17, at 974–76.
61. Kimball et al., supra note 10, at 452–53.
62. Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 15, at 131–35.
63. DARON R. SHAW, THE RACE TO 270: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CAMPAIGN
STRATEGIES OF 2000 AND 2004, at 57–59 (2006).
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HAVA.64 HAVA is the most significant federal election legislation in a generation.
While the law provided funds for new voting equipment, HAVA also imposed
several mandates on state and local election administrators.65 New policies can
impose additional costs on administrators (in terms of budget, staff resources, and
time taken away from other tasks). While HAVA is a federal law, it is administered
by state actors,66 and so local officials may associate the burden of HAVA with
their perception of state officials. Burden and colleagues found that the perceived
administrative burden of election policies shape the attitudes of local election
officials toward those policies and election administration more generally.67 We
hypothesize that the local officials who reported more difficulty implementing
HAVA would offer more negative assessments of election administration in their
state and local jurisdiction. The 2007 survey also included eight questions about
the difficulty of implementing various HAVA requirements. Local officials rated
each item on a scale from zero (“not difficult at all”) to ten (“extremely difficult”).
We created a scale by averaging the eight items.68 There is considerable variation
in this measure—for the ten-point scale the standard deviation is two. In addition,
local officials reported a fair amount of difficulty implementing HAVA,
particularly the requirements for accessible voting for people with disabilities,
provisional voting, and a central voter registration database.69 By estimating these
models, we can examine whether evaluations of the election administration
environment are influenced more by party affiliation or by outside forces. Since
each dependent variable is measured on an ordinal scale, we modeled each
equation as an ordinal logit function. The parameter estimates for each model are
reported in Table 3.
The results in Table 3 show that assessments of the election administration
environment are shaped more by outside forces than by the party affiliation of
election officials. Local officials see more partisan politics and have more negative
evaluations of state officials when they face difficulty implementing HAVA’s
requirements. In addition, officials in large jurisdictions report a more contentious
environment and lower satisfaction with state administration than officials in
smaller jurisdictions. The effects of the HAVA experience and jurisdiction size are
substantially larger than the effects of other variables in the equation. We also
found that local officials in battleground states reported more partisan politics and
less satisfaction with respect to state administrators. Finally, local officials tend to
view partisan politics in state administration in a negative light. Perceiving state

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Help America Vote Act of 2002 § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (2006).
Id. § 15482(a).
Id.
Burden et al., supra note 9, at 741.
The scale is sufficiently reliable (Cronbach’s  = 0.85).
Moynihan & Silva, supra note 14, at 818–19.
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administrators as independent of party politics is positively correlated with local
satisfaction with state administrators (r = 0.41, p < 0.001).
The impact of administrative burden is consistent with accounts of local
election officials as a group that perceive themselves as beleaguered by an ongoing
set of unfamiliar requirements that have made their life more difficult.70 As a
result, the administrative burdens associated with their job have become a
dominant frame by which they understand and interpret their policy
environment.71 While partisan preferences might make local election officials
more or less sympathetic to one policy change or another, it is likely that the
desire to avoid new burdens will trump these preferences.
Table 3: Predictors of LEO Assessments of Election Administration in 200772

Explanatory Variable
Ballots Cast in 2004 (log)
Battleground State
Difficulties with HAVA
State Official Is Elected
State Official Is Partisan
Same Party as State
Official
Opposite Party of State
Official
N
Model

2

(7 df)

Environment Is
Politically
Contentious
Coefficient (SE)
0.22*** (.04)
0.18 (.13)
0.13*** (.03)
0.14 (.14)

State
Administrator Is
Independent
Coefficient (SE)

Satisfied with
State
Administrator
Coefficient (SE)

0.01 (.04)

0.14*** (.04)

0.27* (.13)

0.58*** (.13)

0.11** (.03)

0.15*** (.03)

0.01 (.14)

0.08 (.14)

0.40* (.24)

0.54* (.25)

1.05*** (.25)

0.23* (.12)

0.22* (.12)

0.21* (.12)

0.24 (.15)

0.37* (.16)

0.03 (.15)

1116
70.9***

1097
29.8***

1150
93.6***

Note: Each dependent variable is an ordinal scale that ranges from zero to ten. Cell
entries are ordinal logit coefficients and standard errors. Estimates of the cut-points
between ordinal categories are omitted. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.1, twotailed.

By comparison, party affiliation has little impact on assessments of state
election administrators. Local officials who share the same party affiliation as the
top state official and local officials whose party is the opposite of the state
administrator have basically the same average evaluations of state election

70. Id. at 819; Robert S. Montjoy, The Changing Nature . . . and Costs . . . of Election Administration,
70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 867, 868–70 (2010).
71. Burden et al., supra note 9, at 741.
72. Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials.
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administration. We found that nonpartisan local officials reported less partisan
politics in state election administration and a less contentious administrative
environment than partisan local officials, but the differences are substantively
modest. The method of choosing the state election official (election versus
appointment) has no bearing on local evaluations of the state administrators.
Finally, local officials reported less satisfaction with state administrators in the
three states with a balanced bipartisan state election board (Hawaii, Illinois, and
New York). A bipartisan consensus is required to make decisions in these states,
which can be difficult, and the election boards in Illinois and New York have a
history of inaction.73 It may be the case that inaction at the state level is not
appreciated by local election officials. Overall, local perceptions of partisanship
and political conflict in election administration seem to be driven more by outside
forces than by the party affiliation of election officials.
V. WEAK SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SERVICE REFORM AMONG LOCAL OFFICIALS
Finally, we found some evidence that local officials might not react favorably
to proposals to reform the method of selecting election officials. The 2007 survey
included a question asking whether local officials would favor a proposal to make
election administration part of the civil service system in their state. Overall, 18%
favored the proposal, 28% opposed it, and 54% offered no opinion. With the high
rate of no opinion responses, there may be some room to persuade local officials
of the merits of such a proposal. We did not observe partisan differences in
responses to the question. However, not surprisingly, elected local officials
reported less support than appointed officials for the civil service proposal (see
Figure 5). Since most local officials are elected, and since state legislators tend to
rely on local election officials as a cue on election reform proposals, this may pose
a significant barrier to proposals for nonpartisan election administration.

73. David C. Kimball, Illinois: Ending the Gridlock, in ELECTION REFORM: POLITICS AND
POLICY 190, 194 (Daniel J. Palazzolo & James W. Ceaser eds., 2005); Sarah F. Liebschutz, The
Implementation of HAVA in New York: From Antiques to High Tech, 35 PUBLIUS 597, 612–14 (2005).
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Figure 5: Local Election Official Responses to Civil Service Proposal74
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CONCLUSION
In a political system marked by partisan polarization, there is growing
concern about partisan efforts to manipulate election laws and there are some
misgivings about leaving election administration in the hands of partisan
officials.75 Furthermore, some have proposed replacing partisan election officials
with nonpartisan or bipartisan administrative bodies.76 Before considering
proposed reforms, it is important to assess the current institutions for election
administration. In particular, it is important to examine the attitudes of local
election officials. Local officials represent the bureaucratic layer closest to the
voting public, and, in our decentralized system, they enjoy considerable autonomy
in implementing election laws.
Overall, our findings suggest that partisan differences in the policy
preferences of local election officials are primarily confined to those serving
heavily populated jurisdictions. In addition, party differences among local officials
are most evident on the photo ID issue, a policy that has been the subject of
intense partisan debate in many states.77 Thus, those who are concerned about
74. Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials.
75. Kimball & Kropf, supra note 7, at 1258–60.
76. E.g., id. at 1259.
77. PASTOR, supra note 19, at 3. We acknowledge that some time has passed since these
surveys of local officials were conducted. It is possible that the partisan attitudes of local election
officials have polarized further in the last few years as political parties have offered clearer positions
about their election law preferences.
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partisanship in election administration may want to focus their efforts on officials
at the state level and in large local jurisdictions. The good news is that there are a
relatively small number of election officials who work in heavily populated local
jurisdictions. The bad news is that these officials serve the vast majority of voters
in national elections, so they could be very influential. Furthermore, we did not
find much support among local officials for civil service reform of election
administration, though at the time of the survey many expressed “no opinion.”
Surveys of local election officials help address reform issues by providing
assessments of the environment in which local officials work. A substantial
number of local officials reported that political conflict and partisan politics are
common features of election administration. However, we found that LEO
evaluations of state and local election administration are influenced more by
outside forces than by the party affiliation of election officials. Reports of partisan
conflict and dissatisfaction were more common in heavily populated local
jurisdictions, battleground states, and places where HAVA implementation has
created more administrative difficulties.
Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe that the outside sources of
political conflict will subside. Those who enforce election laws are forced to deal
with the combatants in what Hasen calls “the voting wars.”78 Concerns about
outside forces injecting partisanship into election administration are expressed
clearly by Judge Paul Anderson’s dissent in the recent case of League of Women
Voters Minnesota v. Ritchie:
It is unfortunate that our court has been drawn into the current national
and state conflict between political forces over how citizens can exercise
their right to vote. Nevertheless, we are at the epicenter of this conflict’s
highly polarized and partisan atmosphere as it plays out in Minnesota;
thus we have no choice but to render a decision. That said, the parties
should have been more cognizant of the distaste that courts generally,
and our court, in particular, have for bringing a polarized, partisan
atmosphere with them when they come to our courtrooms. It would have
been more helpful had the parties demonstrated more objectivity in their
arguments, and been more willing to acknowledge the law, both pro and
con, when presenting their arguments to our court.79
Many election administrators likely share Judge Anderson’s lament. However, we
are not optimistic about political parties or other combatants in the voting wars
becoming more objective or open minded when pressing their cause. It is not in
their nature to curb their efforts. For those who are contemplating election
administration reform, it is worth considering that outside forces may be a more

78. HASEN, supra note 3, at ix–xii.
79. League of Women Voters v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636, 694 (Minn. 2012) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting). Many thanks to Doug Chapin for bringing this opinion to our attention.
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potent source of partisanship in election administration than the administrators
themselves.
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Appendix:
Are the Survey Samples Representative?
To assess whether the survey samples of local officials are representative of
the universe of LEOs in the United States, we compared the survey samples to
known information about the population of LEOs. Fortunately we have data on
the universe of LEOs for two key variables in this study: the method of selection
and the party affiliation of the local official. The first three columns in Table A1
show the method of selection and party affiliation for the local officials in our
survey samples. For comparative purposes, the final column shows similar figures
for all local officials coded by Kimball and Kropf.80 The results suggest that our
survey sample is representative of the national population of local election
officials.81 Between fifty-four percent and sixty-four percent of the local officials
in our sample surveys were elected, while the rest were appointed. Roughly half of
the officials in our samples are nonpartisan officials, with the other half split fairly
evenly between Republicans and Democrats. Other efforts comparing the survey
samples to other information about local election officials yielded similar positive
results.82

80. Kimball & Kropf, supra note 7, at 1261–62.
81. One important difference between the census and sample surveys involves coding local
officials in Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, where election administration is shared between
county and municipal officials. The census coded county election officials in those three states. Id.
Meanwhile, the 2009 sample surveys interviewed municipal clerks in those three states and the 2005
and 2007 surveys sampled primarily municipal clerks in Michigan and Wisconsin, but county officials
in Minnesota. A large majority of county election officials in Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin are
elected. In contrast, roughly half of the municipal clerks in those three states are elected while the
other half are appointed. This may account for the differences in the top portion of Table A1.
82. E.g., Barry C. Burden et al., Early Voting and Election Day Registration in the Trenches: Local
Officials’ Perceptions of Election Reform, 10 ELECTION L.J. 89, 102 (2011); Moynihan & Silva, supra note
14, at 817–18.

2013]

573

THE POLICY VIEWS OF ELECTION OFFICIALS

Table A1: Comparing Survey Samples to the Population
of Local Election Authorities83
Selection Method
Elected
Appointed

2005 Survey
Sample

2007 Survey
Sample

2009 Survey
Sample

2005 Census
of LEOs

64%
36%

62%
38%

54%
46%

63%
37%

30%
22%

28%
23%

25%
25%

26%
20%

48%

49%

51%

53%

1357

1407

900

4612

Party Affiliation
Democrat
Republican
Other/Nonpartisan
N

We also compared each of the survey samples in terms of demographic
characteristics. As Table A2 shows, the demographic profiles of local officials in
the survey samples (in terms of age, education, sex, and experience) are very
similar. If the survey samples are biased, it is unlikely that three different randomly
drawn samples of local officials would produce such close demographic
characteristics. These comparisons and the relatively high response rates make us
confident that the survey samples accurately represent the universe of local
election officials in the United States.

83.

Note: Source for 2005 data on all local jurisdictions is Kimball and Kropf (2006).
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Table A2: Demographic Characteristics of Local Election Authorities
Sex

2005 Survey
Sample

2007 Survey
Sample

2009 Survey
Sample

25%
75%

23%
77%

19%
81%

2%
20%
39%
26%
6%
8%

2%
19%
38%
27%
6%
8%

2%
16%
37%
32%
5%
8%

14%
12%
14%
53%

12%
11%
13%
53%

9%
11%
12%
49%

Median Age (Years)

53

53

54

Median Years in Current
Position

10

9

8

Male
Female
Education
Some High School
High School Graduate
Some College, No Degree
College Graduate
Some Graduate School
Graduate Degree
Organization Membership
NACRC
Election Center
IACREOT
State Organization

